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Digest:  Boeken v. Philip Morris USA, Inc. 
Whitney M. Zanias 
Opinion by Kennard, J., with Baxter, Chin, and Corrigan, JJ.  
Dissenting opinion by Moreno, J., with George, C.J. and 
Werdegar, J. 
Issue 
Does a common law action for loss of consortium bar a 
subsequent wrongful death action for loss of consortium under 
res judicata? 
Facts 
Judy Boeken’s (Boeken) now deceased husband, Richard, 
was diagnosed with lung cancer in 1999, after smoking cigarettes 
for forty-two years.1  In October 2000, while Richard was still 
alive, Boeken filed an action against Philip Morris USA, Inc. 
(Philip Morris) for loss of consortium, “seeking compensation for 
the loss of her husband’s companionship and affection.”2  In her 
complaint, Boeken specifically “alleged that she suffered ‘the loss 
of love, affection, society, companionship, sexual relations, and 
support.’”3  Approximately four months after Boeken filed her 
complaint, she dismissed it with prejudice.4 
Richard died one year after Boeken dismissed her action for 
loss of consortium.5  Subsequently, Boeken filed a wrongful death 
action under California Code of Civil Procedure section 377.60 
against Philip Morris for the loss of her husband’s companionship 
and affection.6  In this complaint, Boeken specifically alleged that 
she had suffered “‘loss of love, companionship, comfort, affection, 
society, solace, and moral support.’”7 
Philip Morris then demurred on the complaint, claiming that 
Boeken’s wrongful death action was barred by res judicata, since 
her earlier loss of consortium claim involved the same primary 
 
 1 Boeken v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 230 P.3d 342, 344 (Cal. 2010). 
 2 Id. at 345. 
 3 Id. 
 4 Id. 
 5 Id. 
 6 Id. 
 7 Id. 
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right.8  The trial court sustained the demurrer without leave to 
amend, and Boeken appealed.9  The Court of Appeal affirmed, 
concluding that Boeken’s initial loss of consortium action against 
Philip Morris “covered claims for lost companionship and 
affection between the time of her husband’s actual death from 
lung cancer and the time when he would have died of natural 
causes if defendant’s cigarettes had not wrongfully injured 
him.”10  Therefore, Boeken’s dismissal with prejudice of her loss 
of consortium claim acted as a res judicata bar, which prevented 
her “from relitigating the same injury—loss of consortium—a 
second time in her current wrongful death action.”11  Boeken 
petitioned to the California Supreme Court for review.12 
Analysis 
The court examined the history of wrongful death and 
survival actions.  At common law, there was no recovery for the 
wrongful death of a spouse; however, in 1862, the Legislature 
created a wrongful death cause of action.13  Until Rodriguez v. 
Bethlehem Steel Corp.,14 courts did not recognize a cause of action 
for loss of consortium for the wrongful injury of a spouse.15  
However, the Rodriguez court failed to answer whether recovery 
for loss of consortium damages are limited to predeath 
damages.16  The Rodriguez holding created a significant 
distinction between a common law action for loss of consortium 
and a statutory wrongful death action.17  Since “loss of 
consortium is a civil action sounding in tort,” punitive damages 
are available, whereas punitive damages are not available in the 
statutory wrongful death action.18 
Next, the court examined the precise meaning attached to 
the phrase “cause of action” within the context of res judicata: 
“The cause of action is the right to obtain redress for a harm 
suffered, regardless of the specific remedy sought or the legal 
theory (common law or statutory) advanced.”19  Thus, the 
determinative factor, under the primary rights theory, is the 
 
 8 Id. 
 9 Id. 
 10 Id. 
 11 Id. at 346. 
 12 Id. 
 13 Id. 
 14 Rodriguez v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 525 P.2d 669 (Cal. 1974). 
 15 Boeken, 230 P.3d at 347. 
 16 Id. 
 17 Id. 
 18 Id. 
 19 Id. at 348. 
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harm suffered.20  Generally, the same primary right is involved 
in actions between the same parties seeking compensation for the 
same harm.21  In this case, “[t]he primary right was the right not 
to be wrongfully deprived of spousal companionship and 
affection, and the corresponding duty was the duty not to 
wrongfully deprive a person of spousal companionship and 
affection.”22  Therefore, Boeken could not sue for the same breach 
of duty based on a new legal theory in the second lawsuit.23 
Under section 3283 of the California Civil Code, “‘[d]amages 
may be awarded, in a judicial proceeding, for detriment resulting 
after the commencement thereof, or certain to result in the 
future.’”24  Thus, a plaintiff is entitled to recover for both the loss 
of companionship and affection during the trial and in the future 
for a common law action for loss of consortium.25  In Boeken’s 
initial complaint, she sought recovery for the loss of her 
husband’s consortium both now and in the future: “[A]s a result 
of the cancer he was ‘unable to perform the necessary duties as a 
spouse’ and would ‘not be able to perform such work, services, 
and duties in the future.’”26  Boeken also alleged in her complaint 
that she had been “‘permanently deprived’ of her husband’s 
consortium,” which further illustrates Boeken’s anticipation of 
her husband’s impending premature death.27 
The court also determined that its findings were supported 
by Justus v. Atchison, 28 despite Boeken’s claim “that one may not 
recover at common law damages of a type . . . made the subject of 
a statutory scheme that occupies the field.”29  The Justus court 
clearly acknowledged that the right to recover in a wrongful 
death cause of action solely exists under the statute, and was not 
part of common law.30  Here, the court agreed and found no 
parallel development for wrongful death at common law.31 
 
 20 Id. 
 21 Id. 
 22 Id. at 349 (emphasis omitted). 
 23 Id. 
 24 Id. (quoting CAL. CIV. CODE § 3283 (West 2010)). 
 25 Id. at 349. 
 26 Id. at 350. 
 27 Id. 
 28 Justus v. Atchison, 565 P.2d 122 (Cal. 1977). 
 29 Boeken, 230 P.3d at 351. 
 30 Id. (citing Justus, 565 P.2d at 127–29). 
 31 Id. at 351. 
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Boeken’s reliance on a comment in the Restatement Second 
of Torts32 was also rejected by the court.33  This section in the 
Restatement applies to situations where the loss of consortium 
claim is subsequently joined with a wrongful death claim after 
the spouse has died.34  Here, Boeken sued for loss of consortium 
prior to her husband’s death, and so the Restatement was not 
applicable.  If the court were to limit “loss of consortium claims to 
the lifetime of the injured spouse,” as Boeken suggested, it would 
lead “to multiple proceedings and the possibility of a double 
recovery or an inadequate recovery.”35  Instead, the problems are 
minimized by allowing spouses to recover damages under loss of 
consortium after the death of the spouse.36 
Holding 
The court affirmed the Court of Appeal’s decision.37  The 
court held that res judicata barred Boeken’s wrongful death 
action for loss of consortium.38  Since Boeken brought a prior 
common law action for loss of consortium, both claims involved 
the same primary right.39  The dismissal with prejudice of the 
common law action for loss of consortium is the equivalent of a 
final judgment on the merits, and therefore the action may not be 
relitigated.40 
Dissent 
Justice Moreno dissented, explaining that a common law loss 
of consortium action involves a primary right different from a 
statutory wrongful death action.41  Justice Moreno compared the 
holdings of Justus v. Atchison42 and Rodriguez v. Bethlehem Steel 
Corp.43  In Justus, the court held that the common law loss of 
 
 32 The Restatement provides: 
In case of death resulting to the impaired spouse, the deprived spouse 
may recover under the rule stated in this Section only for harm to his or 
her interests and expense incurred between the injury and death.  For 
any loss sustained as a result of the death of the impaired spouse, the 
other spouse must recover, if at all, under a wrongful death statute. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 693 cmt. f (1977). 
 33 Boeken, 230 P.3d at 351. 
 34 Id. at 351–52. 
 35 Id. at 352. 
 36 Id. 
 37 Id. at 353. 
 38 Id. 
 39 Id. 
 40 Id. 
 41 Id. (Moreno, J., dissenting). 
 42 Justus v. Atchison, 565 P.2d 122, 127 (Cal. 1977). 
 43 Rodriguez v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 525 P.2d 669, 686 (Cal. 1974). 
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consortium action was allowed because it was different from the 
statutory wrongful death action, whereas in Rodriguez, the court 
held that a person may recover loss of consortium damages for a 
nonfatal injury of a spouse.44  Justice Moreno believed that these 
two cases highlighted the differences between a common law loss 
of consortium action and a statutory wrongful death action. 
Justice Moreno also noted the differences between the two 
causes of action: a common law loss of consortium action involves 
only a serious injury, but not death; wrongful death includes an 
action for loss of financial support, but loss of consortium does 
not; and loss of consortium applies only to spouses, but wrongful 
death extends to the children of the deceased.45  Furthermore, 
the statute of limitations for a wrongful death action does not 
begin at the same time as a loss of consortium action, which it 
would if the two actions were a single action.46  Since loss of 
consortium and wrongful death are different, Justice Moreno 
concluded that a loss of consortium action would not bar a 
wrongful death action.47  Instead, Justice Moreno proposed that 
courts “look to accompanying settlement agreements [for the 
dismissal of loss of consortium claims] to determine precisely the 
extent to which the parties were also relinquishing wrongful 
death claims,” since there can be some overlap between the 
damages recovered for wrongful death and loss of consortium 
actions.48 
Legal Significance 
The court’s decision precludes, under res judicata, a spouse 
who has dismissed with prejudice a common law loss of 
consortium action from subsequently bringing a statutory 
wrongful death action.  Now, parties seeking to resolve a common 
law loss of consortium action, but do not wish to bar recovery 
under a wrongful death action, will no longer use voluntary 
dismissal with prejudice as a way of doing so. 
 
 44 Boeken, 230 P.3d at 354 (Moreno, J., dissenting). 
 45 Id. at 354–55. 
 46 Id. at 355. 
 47 Id. at 356. 
 48 Id. at 357. 
